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Understanding ourselves has been a fundamental topic for psychologists and philosophers
alike. In this paper we review the evidence linking specific brain structures to self-reflection.
The brain regions most associated with self-reflection are the posterior cingulate and medial
prefrontal (mPFC) cortices, together known as the cortical midline structures (CMSs). We
review evidence arguing that self-reflection is special in memory, while noting that these
brain regions are often engaged when we think about others in our social worlds. Based
on the CMSs’ patterns of connectivity and activity, we speculate about three possible
interpretations of their role in supporting self-reflection that are somewhat overlapping,
and not intended to be mutually exclusive. First, self may be a powerful, but ordinary
case for a cognitive system specialized for thinking about people. Second, mPFC may
serve as a processing “hub,” binding together information from all sensory modalities with
internally generated information. Third, mPFC may serve as a cortical director of thought,
helping to guide moment-by-moment conscious processing. Suggestions are made for
future research avenues aimed at testing such possibilities.
Keywords: cognitive neuroscience, self-reflection, medial prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate cortex, default mode
network

How do we know what we are like? How do we determine the
boundaries between ourselves and the world around us? How do
we know what is ours, and what is not? Questions like these have
engaged philosophers for millennia, and psychological scientists
throughout psychology’s relatively brief history. Great progress
has been made by practitioners of these fields, who have recently
been joined by neuroscientists bearing the promise of going
beyond introspection, self-report, and behavior to the source of
our sense of self, the brain. This work is theoretically useful in
at least two ways. First, it enables characterization of how the
brain implements the psychological process(es) of self-reflection,
allowing for links between the neural and psychological levels
of analysis. Second, it may suggest new ways to interpret and
modify accounts of self-reflection at the psychological-level, allowing neural-level data to influence psychological-level theorizing.
Wielding two major empirical breakthroughs, cognitive neuroscientists have made significant headway in understanding how the
brain gives rise to a sense of self, revealing surprising knowledge
about the organization of the neuronal networks responsible for
self-reflection.

THE DEFAULT MODE NETWORK AND SELF-REFLECTION
In brief, these breakthroughs consisted first of the discovery of
what has come to be known as the default mode network (Shulman
et al., 1997; Raichle et al., 2001), and second of the independent
identification that a subset of these brain regions are enlisted
when we engage in self-reflection (Gusnard et al., 2001; Johnson et al., 2002; Kelley et al., 2002). To be clear, this network’s
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involvement is observed most closely during the psychological
task of reflecting on one’s personalities and characteristics (selfreflection), rather than during self-recognition, thinking of the
self-concept, or thinking about self-esteem, for example. As such,
this paper will focus on self at the level of self-reflection and
the neural networks responsible for this task. The set of regions
contributing to self-reflection consists primarily of the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), encompassing the medial surface of the
medial frontal gyrus [Brodmann’s Areas (BAs) 8 and 10], and
the medial parietal cortex, roughly encompassing the retrosplenial
and posterior aspects of the cingulate cortex, the area bounded
at the anterior by the paracentral lobule, and at the posterior by
the parieto-occipital sulcus (BAs 23, 31, 7). For ease of reference,
we will refer to this medial parietal cluster together as posterior
cingulate cortex (pCC). These regions have come to be known
together as the cortical midline structures (CMSs) (Northoff and
Bermpohl, 2004), and are the regions most closely associated with
self-reflection in meta-analyses (e.g., Northoff et al., 2006; Qin and
Northoff, 2011).
The default mode network concept arose to explain the puzzling observation that when subjects rest quietly with eyes closed,
CMS activity is elevated (as measured by positron emission tomography), along with that of anterior temporal lobes and lateral
parietal cortices (Shulman et al., 1997). This set of regions is
more active when people rest than when they are engaged in goaldirected tasks, and display functional connectivity: these regions’
activity rises and falls together during the normal course of cognitive engagement and disengagement from the external world
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(Greicius et al., 2003; Fox et al., 2005). This led Raichle and colleagues to propose that this set of regions formed a default mode
network; a network that may serve to generate internal mental
stimuli and pay attention to our stream of consciousness, but
whose activity is attenuated when we turn our attention to the outside world (as in goal-directed tasks) (Gusnard et al., 2001; Raichle
et al., 2001). Following these observations, several labs demonstrated direct overlap between the brain regions engaged during
rest and during self-reflection (Wicker et al., 2003; D’Argembeau
et al., 2005; Schneider et al., 2008; Whitfield-Gabrieli et al., 2011).
This relation is further supported by a meta-analysis (Qin and
Northoff, 2011), which reported that the same finding occurred
across many studies.

MEDIAL PREFRONTAL CORTEX
Several aspects of these regions’ neuroanatomy may support these
well-characterized roles. mPFC is larger than any other prefrontal
region in humans (Ongur et al., 2003). By proportion, it covers
more of the cortex in humans and has more space available for
connections with other supramodal areas than in other primates
(Semendeferi et al., 2001). It has a greater density of dendritic
spines (69% more on average than primary sensory cortex) and
smaller density of cell bodies on the average than other cortical
regions, suggesting more complex associative processing (Jacobs
et al., 2001). Finally, mPFC is almost exclusively interconnected
with other heteromodal processing regions in the prefrontal cortex (Barbas and Pandya, 1989; Petrides and Pandya, 1999), anterior
temporal cortex (Amaral and Price, 1984; Morán et al., 1987), and
the cingulate gyrus (Morecraft and Van Hoesen, 1993; Arikuni
et al., 1994). Most of these connections are reciprocal in nature
(Passingham et al., 2002).
These regions are considered to be part of the “social brain”:
a network implicated by neuroimaging and lesion work in representing the people that populate our social worlds (Adolphs,
2001; Heatherton, 2011; Lewis et al., 2011). mPFC’s enlargement
in humans, preponderance of interconnections rather than cell
bodies, and connections with other “social brain” nodes are all features that point toward a role in social abstraction, a skill for which
humans are evidently selected (Dunbar, 2009). Indeed, humans
form much larger social networks than do other animals (Dunbar,
1998). Lewis et al. (2011) showed further that the size of particular mPFC regions is correlated both with the degree to which
we are able to represent multiple others’ viewpoints and the size
of our social networks. Underscoring the role of mPFC in social
processing in general, and self-processing in specific, a recent metaanalysis further subdivides mPFC into ventral and dorsal aspects
(Denny et al., 2012; Wagner et al., 2012), showing that ventral
mPFC responds more to self, and dorsal mPFC responds more to
others.
MEDIAL PARIETAL CORTEX
Posterior cingulate cortex shares many reciprocal connections with
mPFC. In addition, the subregions of pCC are reciprocally connected with one another in a bilateral manner (Cavanna and
Trimble, 2006). Along with mPFC, pCC is disproportionately
large in humans relative to non-human primates (Goldman-Rakic,
1987). pCC shares many connections with subcortical and cortical
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regions and serves as “association cortex,” allowing the brain to
“integrate both external and self-generated information and to
produce much of the mental activity that characterizes Homo
sapiens” (Cavanna and Trimble, 2006, p. 568). This set of neuroanatomical features suggests that these regions would be good
candidates for those able to perform the inward-focusing and selfgeneration of stimuli that constitute mental activity when we are
not focused on the external world (Mason et al., 2007; Smallwood
et al., 2008). That these regions are disproportionately developed
in humans, and that humans congregate in the largest social networks, suggests that much of this mental activity at rest might be
about ourselves and others.
If we were to plan to design a system that would be able to
retain information about itself, to determine what is and is not
self, and to update that store of information in a flexible and goaldependent manner, we could do worse than to outfit it with the
array of connections and features that are possessed by the CMS.
While the neuroanatomical evidence is certainly suggestive of a set
of regions that are specialized for self-reflection, stronger evidence
has emerged in cognitive neuroscience. Work that we and others
have done has repeatedly demonstrated that reflecting on the self
engages the CMS relative to reflecting about (certain) other people,
or non-social classes of stimuli (Craik et al., 1999; Johnson et al.,
2002; Kelley et al., 2002; Heatherton et al., 2006; Moran et al., 2011;
Whitfield-Gabrieli et al., 2011). This work has supported the idea
that the self is a special cognitive structure, providing a superordinate means by which information can be encoded into memory
(Fossati et al., 2004; Macrae et al., 2004). This position is further
supported by neuropsychological work from Klein et al. (1999)
that revealed a post-lesion dissociation in patients’ abilities to form
memories about the self versus about general semantic categories.
The theoretical position that self-is-special is in direct contrast to
the notion that the self is a “powerful, but ordinary” structure in
memory; a view which suggests that our improved memory for
information encoded in reference to the self is simply a result of
the greater familiarity of the self-concept (Greenwald and Banaji,
1989), but that the semantic structures of self are no different
from the semantic structures of sailboats and silver jewelry. Even
though the cognitive neuroscience evidence strongly supports the
self-is-special view, Denny et al.’s (2012) meta-analytical finding
of a dorsal-ventral axis along which mPFC appears to be differentiated for other- and self-representation appears contradictory.
Why is it the case that, on the one hand, our neural representations
of self and other are so closely allied, but on the other hand these
representations occur in regions of the cortex distinct from (and
largely anatomically disconnected from) those networks that are
engaged when we reflect about non-social sources of information?

WHY DOES SELF-REFLECTION ENGAGE THE CORTICAL
MIDLINE STRUCTURES?
We consider three possible explanations for this pattern of results
that are speculative, not intended to be mutually exclusive, and are
at least partially overlapping. First, one possibility is that Greenwald and Banaji (1989) may have been half-right: it may be that
social information is special, and that the self is a powerful-butordinary social knowledge structure. Second, Heatherton (2011)
has proposed that mPFC serves as a“hub,”binding together heavily
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FIGURE 1 | Schematic representation of three possible distinct, but not
mutually exclusive models of cortical midline structure (CMS)
function. Top left: the CMS are specialized for representing social
information, of which the self is a powerful-but-ordinary subset. Top right:
the CMS serve as a set of regions responsible for the direction of our
thought processes on a moment-to-moment basis. Bottom: the CMS serve
as a hub integrating information from disparate neural processing systems
into a “conscious workspace.”

processed information from secondary sensory areas from each of
the senses with internally generated information to represent the
conscious “workspace.” Third, mPFC may act in a meta-cognitive
fashion by guiding our moment-to-moment thought processes; in
essence, in deciding what to think about next. See Figure 1 for a
schematic representation of each of these models.

IS THE SELF A POWERFUL-BUT-ORDINARY SOCIAL
CONSTRUCT?
On the self is a powerful-but-ordinary social construct view, the
CMS could be seen as representing social information per se, and
their seeming selectivity for self-relevant information might simply represent an extreme case of social information processing
about a social target (the self) that by definition is more familiar
than all other social targets. The overarching view of simulation
theory (Gordon, 1986) is that in order to understand others we
run a mental simulation of how we might act in given social situations. Conversely, the emerging discipline of neural hermeneutics

Frontiers in Human Neuroscience

(Gallotti and Frith, 2013) suggests that in order to understand
ourselves, we pay close attention to the social behavior of others.
Both of these viewpoints converge on the idea that the self might
be a powerful, but ordinary social target.
One obvious prediction of this idea is that the CMS might
be differentially engaged by the representation of (and processing
about) social targets that are differentially familiar to us. Familiarity contains the concepts of both closeness and similarity: close
individuals are those we feel close to (including family and friends),
whereas similar individuals are those who share characteristics
with us (like members of our race, political affiliation, or age
group). Indeed, in Qin and Northoff ’s (2011) meta-analysis, they
observe that stimulus familiarity drives activation in a similar ventral mPFC region just as much as does self-reflection. In addition,
Denny et al.’s (2012) meta-analysis shows that ventral aspects of
mPFC are preferentially engaged by reflecting on the self versus
others. If this region is sensitive to the familiarity (or “selfness”)
of social information, then it should respond more to information that is more self-relevant than not. Several studies have found
such a pattern of results (e.g., Phan et al., 2004; Moran et al.,
2006). Indeed, Mitchell et al. (2006) observed that social targets
manipulated to be similar to the self engaged this ventral mPFC
region, whereas social targets manipulated to be dissimilar to the
self engaged dorsal mPFC. Krienen et al. (2010) clarified Mitchell
et al.’s findings by demonstrating that the driver of activation in
mPFC was closeness rather than similarity per se, suggesting that
the familiarity of repeated exposure to individuals drives their
self-relevance.
Converging on this idea, a series of studies investigating selfreflection in different cultures have provided support for the
notion that in individuals whose cultures are more interdependent, the same ventral mPFC region does not differentiate thinking
about self from thinking about close family members (like participants’ own mothers) (Zhang et al., 2006; Zhu et al., 2007;
Chen et al., 2013), but that this does not necessarily hold true
in Western, more independent cultures (Kelley et al., 2002; Kjaer
et al., 2002; Heatherton et al., 2006; Vanderwal et al., 2008). These
cross-cultural findings are best interpreted in the context of recent
criticisms suggesting that standard delineations between Western
and Eastern cultures are not as clear-cut as has been suggested
(Martinez Mateo et al., 2013). In this context, Moran et al. (2011)
provide data that clarify the distinction between independent and
interdependent cultures. In their paper, consideration of one’s
mother’s personality traits, but not her physical characteristics produced activation levels midway between those of thinking about
one’s own traits versus those of former US President, George
W. Bush. To the degree that we represent the traits of a close
other as being like our own (rather than their physical characteristics), this suggests again that “selfness” may be driving this
difference in ventral mPFC). Considered as a unit, these lines of
research reveal a quantitative dimension along which social targets
of greater familiarity activate ventral mPFC to a greater degree,
with the self sitting at the top as the most familiar social target
of all.
A further prediction of the notion that the CMS are specialized for social processing (and that the self is a powerful subset
of such processing) is that we might be able to differentiate their
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relative contributions along lines in which thinking about ourselves and thinking about others naturally cleave. To the degree
that our representations of ourselves are first-person, and our
representations of others are third-person, one would imagine
that neural systems implicated in social processing that preferentially receive visual information would be more responsive to
third-person representations. Based on the patterns of connectivity that we introduced at the beginning of this paper, it should
be clear that the regions of pCC implicated in the default mode
(and in self-reflection) are strongly linked to regions that create complex visual representations. Indeed, Raichle et al. (2001)
advocate for a domain-general role for the pCC regions in providing complex visual representations to consciousness. Other work
in cognitive neuroscience supports and extends this view, showing via meta-analysis that pCC regions participate in a network
engaged in autobiographical memory, prospective future thinking, and navigation (Spreng et al., 2009). All such tasks require
complex visual representation, and it is interesting that mPFC
did not emerge in this meta-analysis. More direct evidence in
support of the idea that pCC supports the third- rather than firstperson representations more common in thinking about others
rather than the self comes again from the meta-analysis of Denny
et al. (2012). In their paper, they found across 107 studies that
the precuneus was more active when participants thought about
others than when they thought about themselves. Single-study
evidence of the idea that visual rather than conceptual representations of people engage pCC comes from Moran et al. (2011),
who showed that thinking about social targets’ appearance (e.g.,
Does George W. Bush have a beard?) versus thinking about their
character traits (e.g., Is George W. Bush kind?) produces more
activation in pCC. This relationship also held true when the social
target was the self. Direct investigations of adopting third- versus
first-person perspectives have also shown greater pCC involvement during third-person perspective taking (Ruby and Decety,
2001).

IS MEDIAL PREFRONTAL CORTEX A HUB FOR INTEGRATING
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL INFORMATION?
Our second possibility is that the ventral mPFC region identified by Heatherton (2011) serves as a hub that integrates internal
and external information into a conscious workspace. On this
view, self-reflection would be the canonical task for such a region
because it so strongly requires the flexible and ongoing integration
of our own knowledge about ourselves with our ever-changing
knowledge gained from our sense organs about how we are interacting with the environment, and about how social actors in
our environment think about us. Thinking about those social
actors independent from ourselves (theory of mind) would drive
this machinery to a lesser degree (but still more than thinking
about non-social aspects of the world) because rapid and complex integration of sensory, external, and non-sensory conceptual
knowledge is required to understand others’ goals, intentions, and
beliefs, whereas such dynamic processing is much less necessary
for thinking about tools or cars or jewelry. This sort of integration into a conscious workspace is also a hallmark of the cognitive
processes engaged during “rest,” and engendered by the default
mode of brain functioning.
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IS MEDIAL PREFRONTAL CORTEX SPECIALIZED FOR
DIRECTING CONSCIOUS THOUGHT PROCESSES?
Finally, our third possibility is that the ventral mPFC region identified in self-reflection tasks is specialized for helping to decide
in which direction our thought processes should proceed. The
convergence of heavily processed external sensory inputs with
internally generated inputs would also support this view, which
of course is not mutually exclusive with the view that mPFC serves
as a hub for integration of information from disparate neural processing units. To the degree that deciding where our thoughts
should go is a representational process, and that reflection on
those thoughts (and our enduring personality traits) is a metarepresentational version of the same process, one would imagine
that a system with such functional-anatomic properties would be
well-placed to perform both conscious direction of thoughts and
self-reflection. That rest and self-reflection so consistently overlap
(Qin and Northoff, 2011; Whitfield-Gabrieli et al., 2011) suggests
that being free to direct our own thoughts (i.e., not responding
directly to the environment or an experimenter-provided task) is
a state that mimics the natural process observed when we are asked
to reflect directly on our own selves. A prediction of this viewpoint
is that decision-making might be tied to activity in the CMS, and
indeed research shows that CMS activity predicts freely made decisions up to 7 s before participants indicate becoming aware of the
decision having been made (Soon et al., 2008). This third possibility thus may account for the still-puzzling observation that the
mPFC is perhaps the most important actor in the brain’s default
mode network, which itself perhaps serves as a proxy for our ongoing conscious awareness of both our internal and external words.
This conjecture awaits empirical investigation however, not least
because sampling the ongoing representational processes of the
default mode requires disrupting such processes.
CONCLUSION
In summary, we have speculated about several different explanations for the observation that the CMS are observed so consistently
to participate in self-reflection. Neuroanatomical connectivity
suggests that these regions are heteromodal association areas that
derive much of their inputs from upstream regions associated with
social information processing, and that pCC in particular gains its
inputs from regions of the brain responsible for complex visual
representations. Because these regions are associated with social
processing, are developed strongly in humans relative to other
animals, and humans travel in much larger social networks than
do other animals, we speculate that they may form the basis of a
special neurocognitive system evolved for social processing. More
fundamental characterizations of this system suggest that the anterior midline structure, mPFC, is in fact a domain-general region
dedicated as a hub of information processing about the internal
and external worlds, and relatedly, that the purpose of such a confluence of representations is to direct our conscious awareness
from one moment to the next, switching flexibly between representations of our internal mental life and of the world around us.
On this view, mPFC’s seeming specialization for social information
processing merely reflects its response to stimuli (self and others)
that drive the integration of internal and external information
sources more strongly than non-social stimuli.
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Much research remains to be done to gain greater understanding of how and why the self, other social targets, and the
default mode of thought are related to one another, and why
they so reliably involve the CMS. Initial support for the idea
that mPFC regions might be necessary for self-reflection comes
from a study with patients with ventral mPFC damage at the site
implicated by Kelley et al. (2002) as being maximally involved in
self-reflection (Philippi et al., 2012). These patients did not show
the self-reference effect in memory, suggesting that mPFC is necessary for encoding information in relation to oneself. Emerging
advances in TMS may allow researchers to target more closely
these regions for temporary, reversible lesions, or for theta-burst
stimulation for temporary increases in excitability of these regions
(Vernet et al., 2013). Such studies could provide more controlled

evidence to determine whether these regions are necessary for
reflection about self and other. In parallel, advances in real-time
fMRI techniques (deCharms et al., 2004; Hinds et al., 2011) allow
for the exquisite control of presentation parameters, such that
we can manipulate when participants are asked to reflect on
self and others to moments when activation in either mPFC or
pCC are high or low, and determine with a great degree of accuracy what effects natural fluctuations in the default mode at any
given moment might have on our abilities to accurately represent
ourselves.
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